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ILLINOIS TAX

(from page 99)

Concurring Opinions
Justice Stevens and Justice O'Connor disagreed with the majority's reasons for concluding that the Tax Act does not discriminate against
interstate commerce. Justice Stevens noted that
at least on the surface, the Tax Act appears to
discriminate against interstate commerce because interstate calls bear a heavier tax burden.
However, both Justices Stevens and O'Conner
concluded that the practical economic effect of

PENNSYLVANIA LAW
PREVENTING PUBLIC UTILITIES
FROM RECOVERING
FINANCIAL LOSSES THROUGH
RATES OR AMORTIZATION
UPHELD
In Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, - U.S.
109 S. Ct. 609 (1989), the United States Supreme
Court held that a Pennsylvania statute preventing a public utility company from recovering
construction costs of cancelled plants does not
violate the Takings Clause of the fifth amendment of the Constitution. The Court ruled that a
state is free to set rates for public utilities which
balance the interests of the utilities and the
public.
Background
In 1967, two public utility companies, Duquesne Light Company ("Duquesne") and Pennsylvania Power Company ("Penn Power"), decided to increase their generating capacity.
Duquesne and Penn Power entered into an
agreement with several other electric utilities to
construct seven nuclear generating units. In
1980, the construction of four of the facilities was
halted in part due to the Arab oil embargo and
the Three Mile Island accident. The demand for
electricity as well as the desirability of nuclear
energy as a means to meet that demand had
changed. Duquesne and Penn Power respectively had expended $34,697,389 and $9,569,665
in construction costs by the time the project was
cancelled.
In 1980 and 1981 Duquesne petitioned the
Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commission ("the
PUC") to gain permission to recoup its losses
-'

the Tax Act is to proportionately tax both intrastate and interstate calls. Justice O'Connor also
disagreed with the majority's application of the
internal consistency test to state taxes challenged under the Commerce Clause. Finally,
Justice Scalia concurred with the judgment of
the majority and stated that only those taxes that
facially discriminate against interstate commerce
violate the Commerce Clause.
Mary L. Smith

over a ten-year period. The PUC found that the
cancellation of the project was reasonable given
the circumstances and permitted Duquesne and
Penn Power to amortize expenditures over a
ten-year period. In 1982, Duquesne again petitioned the PUC to obtain a rate increase. In 1983,
the PUC allowed Duquesne to increase its revenues $105.8 million to a total yearly revenue
exceeding $800 million. The rate increase included $3.5 million in revenue which represented the first payment to Duquesne for its loss
from the plants' cancellation. The PUC granted
Penn Power the authority to increase its revenues by $15.4 million to a total of $184.2 million.
This increase included the first year of the tenyear amortization recovery.
Prior to the close of the Duquesne rate proceeding in 1982, the Pennsylvania legislature
enacted a law which amended the Pennsylvania
Utility Code ("the Act"). The Act prohibited the
cost of construction of a utility plant undertaken
by a public utility from being included in the
rate base or in rates charged by the utility until
the facility is "used and useful" to the public.
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 66, § 1315 (Purdon 1988). Pursuant to the Act, the Pennsylvania Office of the
Consumer Advocate ("the Consumer Advocate") requested that the PUC reconsider its
order allowing Duquesne to amortize its losses.
The PUC reaffirmed its prior decision, interpreting the Act as excluding the costs of canceled
facilities from the rate base but not as precluding
recovery of costs through amortization.
The Consumer Advocate appealed the PUC's
decision to the Pennsylvania Commonwealth
Court, which held that the PUC had interpreted
the Act correctly. The Consumer Advocate then
appealed to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the
decision of the lower court, holding that the Act
prohibited recovery of the costs for the canceled facilities either through inclusion in the
rate base or by amortization. The Pennsylvania
Supreme Court rejected the utility companies'
assertion that the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution precluded taking without just compensation. The court observed that the '"just
compensation' safeguar[d] to a utility by the
fourteenth amendment... is a reasonable return
on the fair value of its property at the time it is
being used for public service." 109 S. Ct. at 614.
Because the facilities in question were never
used by the public and no operating expenses
had been incurred by the utilities, there was no
constitutional right to recovery.
Duquesne and Penn Power appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. They contended
that the Act's prohibition against recovering the
costs of construction in their rates violated the
Takings Clause of the fifth amendment of the
Constitution.
Basis of the Supreme Court's Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court first inquired into its
jurisdiction to decide the case. Under 28 U.S.C
§ 1257(2), the Court has authority to review a
final judgement from a state's highest court
where a state statute is challenged and the state
court holds the statute is not repugnant to the
Constitution. Because the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania had held the Act to be constitutional, the United States Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to review the judgment.
The Supreme Court held that even though
public utilities serve the needs of the public,
they are subject to the Takings Clause of the fifth
amendment because they are owned by private
investors. Therefore, the rate methods set by a
public utilities commission must not result in a
confiscation of property without just compensation. The Court discussed the constitutional
ramifications of rate-setting methods used by
utilities. The Court stated that a rate is confiscatory if it is so low that it destroys the value of the
property for all the purposes for which it was
acquired and deprives the utility of its property
without due process of law. Consequently, if a
rate does not afford sufficient compensation to a
utility then the utility has not been afforded just
compensation as guaranteed by the Takings
Clause.

History of Rate Setting Methods: Fair Value and
Historical Cost Rules
The Court reviewed two past rate-setting
methods which met the constitutional minimum. Once considered the only constitutionally acceptable method of setting rates, Smyth v.
Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898), the fair value rule is
based on the operation of the competitive
market. The fair value rule provides that rates be
set in accordance with the actual present value
of the assets employed in public service. Under
this rule, if a utility's investment is good, the
utility earns an above-cost return. If the investment is a poor one, however, it has no fair value
and thus justifies no return. Subsequently, the
Court held an alternative approach to be an
acceptable method of fixing utility rates. Federal
Power Comm'n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944). Under the historical cost or prudent investment rule, the utility is compensated
at actual cost for all investments which are prudent when made, regardless of whether the
investments are deemed necessary or beneficial
in hindsight.
The Court noted that the Pennsylvania ratesetting method is based on a modified historical
cost standard. The Court emphasized that it is
not the rate-setting method but the impact of
the rate order that is dispositive. If the cumulative effect of the rate order is not unreasonable,
any judicial inquiry is at an end. When a particular rate is confiscatory, however, it must be more
closely scrutinized. The Court indicated that
one element pertinent to the setting of rates is
the return investors expect given the risk of the
undertaking. Whether a rate is unjust is contingent on what is a fair rate of return under a
particular rate-setting method, as well as on the
amount of capital upon which investors are
entitled to earn a return. Constitutional implications arise when a state arbitrarily switches ratesetting methods in such a way that the utility or
investors bear the risks of bad investments and
are denied the benefits of good investments.
Pennsylvania's Rate-Setting Method Held to be
Constitutional
The Court held that the impact of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's rate orders did not violate the Takings Clause of the fifth amendment.
The Act's prohibition against amortized recovery would only deny Duquesne's annual allow(continued on page 102)
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(from page 101)

ance by 0.4% and Penn Power's annual allowance by 0.5%. Therefore, the overall impact of
the rate orders was not confiscatory. The Court
reasoned that the reduced rates would not
undermine the financial soundness of either
utility nor would the rates deprive individual
investors of just compensation.
Duquesne and Penn Power asserted that the
Act was inconsistent because the "used and useful" standard normally is associated with the fair
value approach and Pennsylvania used the historical cost method. Duquesne and Penn Power
argued further that the Act undermined the
PUC's duty to balance the interests of the consumer and the investor. The Court rejected both
of these arguments. Because the PUC is an arm
of the state legislature it is competent to set
utility rates. Furthermore, utility rates are not
subject to attack merely because a combination
of rate-setting methods are used.
The Court also rejected the contention that
the historical cost rule should be adopted as the
single constitutional standard. A public utilities
commission need not follow any single standard

WEST VIRGINIA STATUTE
REGULATING FUNERAL
INDUSTRY IS NOT PREEMPTED
BY FEDERAL REGULATION AND
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
In National Funeral Services, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 870 F.2d 136 (4th Cir. 1989), the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
held that a West Virginia statute regulating preneed funeral contracts was not preempted by
the Federal Trade Commission's ("the FTC's")
Funeral Rule. 16 C.F.R. 453 (1989). The court also
held that the statute did not violate the right to
free commercial speech guaranteed by the first
amendment of the Constitution.
West Virginia Statute
In 1955, the West Virginia legislature determined that preneed funeral contracts were void
unless all proceeds of the contract were placed
in trust pending the contract beneficiary's time

or combination of standards when setting rates.
Such a rule would limit alternatives that may be
beneficial to both consumers and investors. The
Constitution provides broad guidelines wherein
the state legislatures and utility commissions are
free to decide the rates that best serve the interests of the public and the investors.
Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
Justices Scalia, White and O'Connor concurred. They noted that although the Constitution does not dictate a rate-setting method, the
historical cost or prudent investment method
should always be considered when assessing the
constitutionality of the impact of a particular
rate order.
Justice Blackman dissented. He believed the
Court did not have jurisdiction to hear the case
because there was no final judgment before the
Court. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court had
invalidated the rate orders set by the PUC and
remanded the case for further ratemaking. Because no new rates had been set, the judgement
of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not final.
Martha D. Owens
of need. Since that time, the state legislature
imposed increasingly strict regulations upon
preneed funeral contracts. The current West
Virginia statute ("the Act"), W. Va. Code §47-141 (1983), encompasses all preneed sales of burial
goods, funeral goods, and funeral services, and
declares any contract void which isnot solicited,
drafted, and executed in accordance with the
Act. The statute also requires that all sellers of
such goods be licensed by the state and that all
employees of a seller be certified by the state.
The Act permits the advertisement of preneed
funeral contracts. However, in an effort to reduce fraud and protect privacy, it prohibits two
types of solicitation: 1) in-person or telephone
solicitation of potential purchasers who are in
nursing homes, hospitals, and private residences, and 2)any solicitation of relatives of persons
near death. The Act regulates the terms of the
sale by mandating that ninety percent of the
contract proceeds be placed in a trust pending
the contract beneficiary's time of need, and that
stated procedures for the disposition of trust
income be observed.

